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Human beings tend, when faced with equally unacceptable
alternatives, to rationalize inaction. They either insist that the
anticipated evil will not be so bad after all (may even be a blessing in
disguise), or posit miraculous solutions.
Lately, this propensity has warped American understanding
of the Iranian threat. And this was exacerbated by the U.S. National
Intelligence Estimate on Iran
released late last year, which, while emphasizing the closing down of weaponization programs in 2003, downplays the regime’s
unflagging efforts to enrich the uranium that is crucial to nuclear weapons
production. Meanwhile, prominent voices in the United
States say there is little to worry about.
Deterrence theorists assert that a nuclear Iran
may actually prove a stabilizing force in the region. They suggest that a
nuclear Iran
may provide the foundation for a regional order based on the Cold War
doctrine of mutually assured destruction – MAD.
At the same time, proponents of democracy promotion draw a
different analogy between Iran
today and the Soviet Union in the mid 1980s. They
focus on Iran’s
economic situation and the attraction of the younger generation to Western
culture, arguing that American “engagement” with civil society in Iran
will generate an Iranian revolution, just as American involvement with the
opposition in the USSR
contributed to the fall of the Soviet Empire.
Unfortunately, both the deterrence theorists and those who
put their faith in the triumph of democracy have pinned their hopes on flawed
analogies.
Cold War nuclear deterrence was based not on small nuclear
arsenals in the hands of several countries, but on large stockpiles held by
two nations (or two alliances) that really did assure mutual destruction. The
first years of the Cold War, before the two superpowers developed the
capabilities for mutual destruction – and the command and control mechanism
to prevent such a catastrophe – were the most dangerous. Moreover, the Cold
War was, in essence, a bilateral struggle between American and Soviet blocs,
which simplified the signaling of intentions and lessened the likelihood of
misunderstandings. And public discussion of nuclear weapons in the United
States and the Soviet Union
during the Cold War tended to be restricted to experts, so policy makers
could develop rational strategies with little public pressure to take more
belligerent positions. Crowds in Washington
or Moscow never demonstrated, as
they have in Pakistan,
with models of nuclear bombs and calls to use them.
None of these stabilizing characteristics of the Cold War
strategic balance are present in the wider Muslim world. A nuclear Iran
will provoke Saudi Arabia
and Egypt to
acquire their own military nuclear capability,
leading to a “poly-nuclear” Middle East in which the
potential for nuclear error will be greatly multiplied. The notoriously weak
and fragmented autocracies of the Muslim Middle East have shown a much higher
predilection for the reckless resort to military force than the United
States and the Soviet Union
ever did. Religious and nationalistic fervor have led Arab countries to
countless military debacles lengthening, for example, Iran’s
bloody war with Iraq
until both countries were devastated. Religiously inspired confidence in
divine providence – including the Shi’ite belief
that the Hidden Imam, in the form of a mahdi, will
fight on the side of Allah’s soldiers and protect them – heightens the risk.
The hopes for imminent democratic transformation in Iran
also depend on a misleading comparison. The disparity between the Soviet
Union before its collapse and Iran
today is vast. The Communist ideology that went bankrupt in the Soviet
Union was a secular ideology superimposed on the nation’s root
culture and religion. Its abandonment did not entail giving up basic beliefs.
In contrast, the Islamic government in Tehran,
though lacking popularity, does represent a strong tradition in Iran
that existed before the revolution and retains the devotion even of many of
those who oppose the regime. Furthermore, the Soviet Union
did not fall overnight. Its collapse began with the first stages of dÈtente in the 1970s, followed by a series of
destabilizing leadership changes, the ruinous effort to keep up in the 1980s
with the U.S.
arms build-up, and the demoralizing defeat in Afghanistan.
At best, Iran
presents weak analogies to these factors.
Even if, despite the substantial dissimilarities to the Soviet
Union, one accepts that Iran
is tending to a democratic counterrevolution, the timeline makes the
transformation largely irrelevant to the nuclear crisis. Even the optimists
do not see democratic change happening within the next year or two, the time
most experts believe Iran
needs to cross the threshold to a military nuclear capability.
So what should be done if Iran
refuses to cease and desist from enriching uranium? All options short of the
military option should be explored and exploited. But if, as seems
increasingly likely, they prove unavailing, the most effective option may
well be a full-blown naval blockade of Iran,
cutting off supplies of refined oil and other strategic goods. Because of Tehran’s
dependence for roughly a third of its refined oil on imports – and the
dependence of its own capacity to refine oil on refined oil – a blockade will
bring the regime to a breaking point within months, if not weeks. The
necessary rationing of essential commodities may cause key regime leaders and
respected clerics in Qom to
question the wisdom of sacrificing the country to acquire nuclear weapons.
If necessary, a blockade will prove a test for the United
States and certainly entails major risks,
but less of a test and fewer risks than a military strike on nuclear
facilities throughout Iran.
Moreover, such a course of action has the virtue of facing up to, rather than
wishing away, the Iranian threat.
Shmuel Bar is a Koret Visiting Distinguished Fellow at the
Hoover Institution, Stanford University, California.
Peter Berkowitz is the Tad and Dianne Taube Senior Fellow at the Hoover
Institution, Stanford University.
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